“Hell To Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-47,” by D. M. Giangreco, Naval Institute Press, 412 pages, $36.95.
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In 1945, Harry S. Truman authorized the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was a gamble, intended to shock Japan into surrender.
Many of Truman’s military advisers opposed the decision. They felt the gamble would not work, wasting the two bombs. Yet Japan surrendered Aug. 15, 1945, nine days after Hiroshima was bombed.
A cottage industry has since arisen to explain why the bombs were unnecessary. Japan would have surrendered anyway, it is claimed, or a demonstration of the bomb off Tokyo harbor would have worked just as well.
These claims are often based on cursory examination of the situation. No rigorous study of the strategic situation was attempted in the immediate aftermath of war’s end. Many misconceptions arose about Japan’s inability to continue fighting resulted.
Those misconceptions should be dispelled by “Hell To Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 194-1947.” This book, by D. M. Giangreco may be the first comprehensive examination of the late-war records of both combatants.
It reveals a Japan that was much more militarily capable than commonly believed at the time or today.
It paints a picture of a Japan that felt it could successfully deter an American invasion — and shows that judgment that may have been optimistic, but not unrealistic.
Giangreco also examines American invasion plans, and the possible consequences. The result would have been a bloodbath.
Nearly 1 million replacements were planned to replace expected Allied casualties in the invasions. American planners believed that in excess of 10 million Japanese — military and civilian would be killed.
This number was just half of Japanese planners’ estimates. To achieve a Japanese victory, they were willing to see 20 million Japanese dead.
Giangreco also reveals why the American military opposed strategic use of atomic bombs. They preferred using them tactically, to clear Japanese strong points once Allied forces were in Japan. They also planned to minimize Allied casualties through extensive chemical warfare.
Fortunately, none of this was necessary, because Truman’s gamble worked. But “Hell to Pay” shows that even that was barely enough. Japanese militarists almost derailed surrender.
In light of its subject, reading “Hell to Pay” is often heavy going. Yet, the book provides crucial insights into of one the most criticized decisions of World War II.
Disparaging the use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is easy before reading “Hell to Pay.” It is more difficult after doing so.
Mark Lardas, an engineer, freelance writer, amateur historian and model-maker, lives in League City.
