The Galveston County Daily News

TEXAS CITY — Looking out the window from Keith Casey’s office, the physical changes to the BP refinery in Texas City since a cascade of explosions killed 15 people four years ago are evident.

There’s a $300 million wet gas scrubber that was installed to cut down on emissions, there are 27 miles of new steam system piping, buses run the roads between units instead of personal vehicles, and all of its employees now enter the refinery through a $30 million main building that has locker rooms and training rooms.

Since he became the manager of the nation’s third-largest oil refinery three years ago, Casey has guided BP Texas City through a $1 billion overhaul that saw every process unit in the refinery retooled.

The massive overhaul began six months after the March 23, 2005, fatal explosions. BP officials took advantage of a total refinery shutdown forced by the approach of Hurricane Rita.

The last of the work was done three months after Hurricane Ike forced yet another complete shutdown of the refinery.

Change In Culture

Investigations by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Chemical Safety Board, the United Steelworkers Union and BP’s own internal investigation, headed by former Secretary of State James Baker, found process safety culture at BP had been lacking for decades.

Casey said the “buy in” by management and employees on new approaches to changes in the safety culture at BP “humbles and inspires” him each day.

The changes included beefing up the refinery’s training procedures, implementing an apprenticeship program in partnership with the United Steelworkers union and restructuring the management and staffing organization in the refinery to provide more emphasis on process safety.

The company also launched a “Stop Work if You Think it’s Unsafe” program where any BP employee or contractor can force a shutdown of work if he or she thinks what is happening is not safe.

The change, though, is at least symbolically visible in Casey’s office, as well as other parts of the 1,200-acre site, with signs or photos that stress three core values — Investment in People, Investment in Plant and Investment in Process.

“You’re not going to see all the hours of training that we’ve put in, but I can see very visible examples,” Casey said. “We have apprentices working side-by-side with seasoned, 25- to 30-year craftsmen learning that trade.”

Process Safety Changes

Internal processes also have changed.

Each job within the refinery requires a work permit. Before the March 2005 blasts, that system was not rigorously followed and often times discarded, investigations found.

Now a new control of work system requires extensive checks, rechecks and consistent permitting for projects across the refinery.

Supervisors on units also are held more accountable for startups, shutdowns and other critical operations and, when a shift change happens, the handover process includes a written documentation that has to be signed off on by the shift supervisors.

The investigations into the 2005 explosions found the lack of communication about the startup of an octane boosting process unit put at-risk people working on a unit nearby. Those investigations also found that in addition to outdated and malfunctioning equipment, communication between shifts on the unit where the blasts occurred was deficient.

Partnership With Union

No more vocal a critic of BP and its lack of process safety culture was there than the United Steelworkers. From the day the fatal blasts occurred, the union that represents the bulk of the BP work force used the company as the poster child for how an unsafe operation was managed.

Now, in large part, BP is still an example for the union, but as a company that should be an example for others in the industry to follow.

Schedule conflicts prevented Gary Beevers, the vice president of the union, to comment for this article, but the union has acknowledged in congressional testimony and in public statements that changes have been positive at the Texas City site.

In large part that is because the union and the company have partnered on a series of standards.

The Steelworkers outlined a 10-point plan initiative on health and safety that was adopted at the Texas City refinery, as well as BP’s other refineries in the United States.

That includes the implementation of the union’s Triangle of Prevention training that was designed by former Amoco Chemical Texas City employee Glenn Erwin, now a top union official who also was a member of the Baker review panel.

Review of near misses and incidents at the refinery also include union involvement.

“In the bad old days, investigation was more of a blame game, whoever touched it last (got blamed),” Casey said. “But TOPS focuses you on the systems of safety — what broke down in your systems to allow that event to occur, and it brings the hourly work force and management together. ... So you are not looking to blame the people who were there at the time, but how do I improve the system to keep that from occurring?”

Not All Coming Up Roses

Despite a change in culture and physical changes at the refinery, BP Texas City still has its fair share of challenges.

The Texas Attorney General took action against the company for “willful violations” of the state’s environmental laws. While most of the instances that led to the lawsuit occurred before or included the March 2005 blasts, it was a clear indicator for many BP has a long way to go to convince the public and regulators that change is more than a slogan, shiny new pipe or a new building.

“Once you have violated the trust, people will never forget, but they will eventually forgive if you do the right things,” Casey said. “I still get a lot of challenges are we doing the right stuff quick enough, but I also get a lot of positive comments from people noticing the difference.”